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SIGNATURES OF IDEOLOGY:
THE CASE OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
CRIMINAL DOCKET
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I. INTRODUCTION
Everyone suspects that Supreme Court justices' own views of policy
play a part in their decisions, but the size and nature of the part is a matter of
vague impression and frequent dispute. Do their preferences exert some
pressure at the margin or are they better viewed as the mainsprings of deci
sion? The latter claim, identified with legal realism, has been lent some
support by political scientists 1 who point out that some justices regularly vote
for or against certain kinds of claims (for example, under the Fourth Amend
ment),2 or that votes in some areas are broadly predictable according to a
single "ideal point" that tries to sum up each justice's preferences, 3 or that
justices who dissent from a decision often will not acquiesce to it in future

cases. 4 The reason these studies haven't made much of an impression in the
legal academy probably is that lawyers and scholars sense many reasons why

judges' behavior may follow predictable patterns, not all of them related to

their own preferences. Some justices may have ideas about interpretation
*
Professor of Law, Boston University.-Ecl. Thanks to Jack Beermann, Robert Bone,
Ronald Cass, Oona Hathaway, Andrew Kull, Gary Lawson, Saul Levmore, Eric Posner, Richard
Posner, and workshop participants at the University of Chicago Law School and Boston University
School of Law for helpful comments; and special thanks to James Lindgren at Northwestern Uni
versity School of Law for advice and assistance with the quantitative side of the project, and
especially with Chart 2. I also am grateful to Alon Cohen, Miller Brownstein, Veronica Ebhuoma,
Eric Labato, Justin Smith, and Yingchun Zhou for marvelous research assistance.

l . The political scientists who press these claims call themselves not realists but attitudinal
ists. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
2. E.g., Jeffrey A. Segal, Predicting Supreme Coun Cases Probabilistically: The Search
and Seizure Cases, 1962-1981, 78 AM. PoL . Sci. REV. 891 (1984).
3. E.g., Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Coun, 1953-1999, 10 PoL . ANALYSIS 134 (2002).
4.
(1999).

E.g. , HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL
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that happen to produce outcomes friendly to one side or another as byprod
ucts; and a j udge's public reputation as a "conservative" or "liberal," to
5
which some of the political science work gives weight in explaining votes,
likewise might arise because the judge's interpretive approach happens to
yield results that conservatives or liberals like.
A closer look is needed at judicial behavior in cases where the policy
stakes are similar but the sources of interpretive dispute are different, the
better to reveal which dominates which. The best set of such cases is found
on the Supreme Court's criminal docket. Cases involving accused or con
victed criminals raise all sorts of legal issues but can be seen to involve a
common set of policy stakes: the courts have to referee disputes, often of a
zero-sum character, over the advantages to be enjoyed by the government
and the accused or convicted defendant. Of course one also can divide up
criminal cases into narrower categories that may involve different policies;
6
we will try it later. But the hypothesis that all such cases involve similar
rough trade-offs as a matter of policy is a useful starting point. It gives us
many decisions to study; cases about criminals usually take up around a
third of the Court's docket every term, which is enough to support interest
ing statistical inquiries and generalizations.
I compiled a database of all the Court's criminal cases over the past fifty
years, defining them broadly to include appeals from criminal convictions,
questions of search and seizure, disputes over the rules of evidence or of
criminal procedure, civil rights claims brought by prisoners against their
keepers, and many others: any cases where the government has been on one
7
side with an accused or convicted defendant on the other. The next step was
to separate cases involving different types of interpretive issues, which I did
as an initial matter by splitting them into two categories: the constitutional
and the nonconstitutional. The constitutional cases typically involve defen
dants' claims that their rights were violated under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments. The nonconstitutional kind involve dis
putes over the federal rules of evidence and procedure, the meaning of
federal criminal statutes, the availability of habeas corpus, and so forth.

5. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme
Court Justices, 83 AM. PoL. Sc1. REV. 557 (1989).
6.

See discussion infra Part V.

7. The data for the study were derived from the United States Supreme Court Judicial Da
tabase at Michigan State University. Using that database creates some possible problems because it
is not written to accommodate these inquiries; cases are not coded "criminal" or "non-criminal," and
some of the codings used by its creator, Harold Spaeth, seem idiosyncratic and difficult to under
stand in application. I therefore compiled an independent database for all of the Court's criminal
cases since the arrival of William Rehnquist in 1972. The correlations found in that data were
greater than the correlations found using the Spaeth database. Political scientists understandably
prefer to rely on findings based on standardized sources rather than on data collected independently,
see Lee Epstein et al., The Political (Science) Context of Judging, 47 ST. Loms U. L.J. 783, 807-09
(2003), and since it makes little difference to the outcome here (if anything, it understates the effect
I claim to find), all the graphs that follow are based on the Spaeth database.

October 2005]

Signatures of Ideology

69

II. RESULTS
The basic results can be seen in two ways. Chart 1 consists of a pair of

lines, each based on career data for all of the justices since 1953. One shows
how often each justice voted for the government in nonunanimous criminal
cases involving constitutional claims. The other shows the same for cases
depending on some other source of law-usually a statute or rule. The jus
tices are ordered here according to the data (that is, by the mean of the two
lines) to show the alignment between the two trends.

CHART 1: How 0FfEN U.S. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES HAVE VOTED
FOR THE GOVERNMENT IN NONUNANIMOUS
CRIMINAL CASES SINCE 1953
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The lines are notable for both their slopes (the tremendous difference

between the justices to the right and to the left) and their similarities (the

closeness of the two points with respect to any given justice). A different
way to express the result is by removing the justices' names from the graph
and instead putting their votes in constitutional cases along the bottom and

their votes in nonconstitutional cases along the side. We then have Chart

2,

a

scatterplot of the twenty-eight justices since 1953 correlating the proportion
of their votes for the government in nonunanimous criminal cases of the two
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types. 8 An increase in the share of votes for the government along one of
the dimensions is very likely to mean an increase along the other; a fitted
line shows a strong linear relationship between ruling in favor of the gov
ernment in either situation. The Pearson correlation coefficient (R) is an

2

extremely high .97, accounting for 94% of the variance (R ) (sig
nif. = 0.0000000000000002).

CHART 2: U.S. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES' VOTES FOR
THE GOVERNMENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
BY NONCONSTITUTIONAL CASES

(NONUNANIMOUS), 195 3-2002
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For lawyers to whom the graphs are gibberish, we can say it this way:
knowing how often a justice votes for the government in the constitutional
cases gives us a very strong sense of how often he votes that way in the
cases not involving the Constitution.
Interpretive byproducts. The interesting question is why some justices
vote for the government so much more often than others-and why this ten-

year).

8.

Robert Jackson is excluded because his time on the Court after 1953 was so short (one

October 2005)

Signatures of Ideology

71

dency tends to be so similar in different types of criminal cases. The results
seem generally consistent with the realist hypothesis: the graphs reveal for
each judge a signature of ideology, perhaps invisible on a reading of the
judge's opinions but evident enough when the results are viewed as a set.
But the point isn't that the decisions are "all politics," or that the justices
always vote their policy preferences. We must remember that the cases we
are studying are the nonunanimous ones, and that there are others where the
9
left-most and right-most justices agree. The better interpretation is that
every case provokes competition between a justice's preferences on the one
hand and the legal materials on the other. When the legal materials are very
strong, they can produce unanimity despite conflicting preferences. But
when the legal materials aren't so strong-when they don't point to a clear
answer and leave room for discretionary judgment-the competition is won
by the justice's underlying preferences and views of the world. Those views
of the world are the same regardless of what provision is at stake in a case;
that is why there is so much convergence between the results in cases in
volving different sources of law. Whether a statute or rule or the
Constitution is involved, the important question is simply how clearly the
justices think the source of law speaks to the case. That clarity is a function
of norms about what sorts of arguments the materials plausibly will accom
modate.
These are natural conclusions from the data, but before settling on them
we should consider some alternatives. First, might the results be explained
by pointing to interpretive theory? It is well known that some justices tend
more often than others to vote against the claims of criminal defendants, but
some of those same justices also are the ones who endorse originalism as an
approach to constitutional interpretation. Justice Scalia in particular sub
scribes to the view that the words of the Constitution should be given their
10
original meanings; perhaps some others, such as Justice Thomas, think this
as well. One byproduct of originalism might be consistent rulings for the
government in criminal cases. The parts of the Bill of Rights concerning
criminal procedure limit what the government can do; defendants often ar
gue for updated and expanded readings of those limits, which an originalist
might reject on grounds of interpretive principle. Maybe that is too cursory a
11
reading of defendants' claims or of the originalist reaction to them, but this
notion of interpretive byproducts at least has surface plausibility; it suggests
how judges' tendencies to vote for the government or for defendants could
be traced to differences in how they approach the task of interpretation-a

9.
In the period covered by the first pair of graphs, the Court decided criminal cases unani
mously 31 % of the time: in 27% of the constitutional cases and in 37% of the nonconstitutional
cases.

10.
See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, Address at University of Cincinnati
(Sept. 16, 1988), in 57 U. C1N. L. REV. 849 (1989).
11.
For examples of originalist arguments put in the service of defendants, see, County of
Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
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legalistic explanation for the large variation in the justices' inclination to
vote for the government in constitutional cases.
But then what about the nonconstitutional results? Of course there are
theories of statutory interpretation just as there are theories about how to
read the Constitution, and sometimes they are analogous: those who like
originalism as a constitutional theory often like textualism as an approach to
interpreting statutes, and the two approaches resemble one another; indeed,
12
in Scalia's view they are the same. But I do not know of a story about the
consequences of textualism in reading statutes that quite matches the story
about the consequences of originalism in reading the Constitution-a story
that explains why textualism should be expected to help the government so
much more often than defendants. Most of the rules in the criminal cases the
Court decides are not written to help one side or the other in the same way
that the Bill of Rights was written for the benefit of defendants; and most of
the rules and statutes the Court interprets are no more than ten or twenty
years old, so there is no reason to expect their original understandings to
systematically help one side more than the other. Nor do most other ap
proaches to reading rules and statutes-for example, giving effect to their
purposes or studying their legislative histories-seem likely to favor one
side consistently. And if we could find theories of statutory interpretation
that did tend to favor one side, we still would have the problem of explain
ing why the byproducts they produce are so similar to those found in
constitutional cases; in other words, we would need to account not only for
the slope of the statutory line but also for its correlation with the constitu
tional line.
The picture just sketched was a little too quick, for there is one promi
nent doctrine of statutory interpretation that does favor the accused in a
criminal case: the rule of lenity, a canon of construction which generally
provides that ambiguities in criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of
13
defendants. But the rule does not do much to explain the data. From 1994
through 2001, the rule of lenity was raised by at least one of the justices in
nineteen cases, and its applicability was rejected in sixteen of them. Every
one occasionally signs onto opinions invoking the rule of lenity, usually as
the third or fourth argument for a result; it tends not to distinguish the jus
tices from one another because the cases where they endorse the rule often
are unanimous. Thus Justice Breyer endorsed the application of the rule of
lenity three times, but in all three cases everyone agreed. Justice Stevens has
joined opinions endorsing the application of the rule of lenity twenty-two
times; in the same period Justice Rehnquist did so twenty-one times. The
only justice to use the rule of lenity often and distinctively is Justice Scalia,

12. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERP RETATION 38 (1997) ("What I look for in
the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what
the original draftsmen intended.").
13. See, e.g., United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39 (1994). For more discussion, see infra
text accompanying note 87.
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who applied it i n ten of the last eleven cases where i t was made an issue.
This helps explain why Scalia's votes in statutory cases tend to favor the
government less often than his votes in constitutional cases, for there is no
rule of lenity in constitutional law. But the rule has no application to most of
the Court's nonconstitutional cases, either, since it only applies to statutes
defining the elements of crimes and the sentences for them. If a large share
of the Court's criminal docket involved statutes of that sort, or if the crimi
nal law were full of doctrines like the rule of lenity, we might have the start
of a legalist's story about why some justices vote for the government so
much more often than others. Neither is so.
Noninterpretive values. There may be other ways to explain the numbers
that don't involve interpretation but also are not matters of raw policy pref
erence. A judge may think that doubts about the meaning of both statutes
and the Constitution should be resolved in favor of various values: the right
to a jury trial, a right to careful review before a death sentence is carried out,
or broader notions of a right to fair treatment. On the other side, a judge
may be reluctant to meddle too much with death sentences or be anxious to
avoid gratuitous interference with a state's machinery of criminal justice.
Those sorts of positions can be relevant to a wide variety of criminal cases,
so a judge's views about them might leave a consistent signature of the kind
shown in the graphs. And a judge might say that those views are not his own
preferences but are the preferences he thinks inform the Constitution and
therefore should guide his decisions when guidance from more specific legal
materials gives out. The values friendly to defendants, for example, may be
taken as echoes from many provisions of the Bill of Rights taken together
with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the batch more
helpful to the government might be derived from notions of federalism
found in the structure of the Constitution and from its textual acknowledg
ment that the government has the power take a defendant's life. 14 This
account may be plausible on its face but it raises many questions. The task
of deriving such general guidance from the Constitution is amorphous; the
document is full of values which, as just shown, often will conflict. How
likely is a judge to be able to choose between them without giving effect to
his own priors about which are most important? (How else is he supposed to
arbitrate between them?) And then how often are those values perceptibly at
stake in the cases?

14.

U.S. CONST. amend. V:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a pre
sentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or prop
erty, without due process of law[.]
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Ill. SOME MECHANISMS OF IDEOLOGICAL DECISION
Those last questions are empirical matters that can't be resolved through
abstract speculation or by taking a bird's eye view of the enterprise. It will
make things more concrete to look at some cases and ask what happens in
them that could generate such striking patterns in the large. The justices rou
tinely engage in heated disputes that may look for all the world like they
depend on law; if the true springs of decision are their own priors, what
mechanisms translate them into the debates that we read in their accounts of
their disagreements? The value of seeing some examples will be especially
great in the wake of the arguments made a moment ago: I said that interpre
tive theory doesn't explain the justices' votes in nonconstitutional cases, but

I didn't show it; I only asserted that I know of no theory with such power. I
also suggested that there may be no baseline of neutrality in some of these
cases-that votes follow from priors inevitably. And finally there were ques
tions about whether the cases might involve competition between values in
the Constitution even where its provisions are not directly at stake. All of
these ideas may cause the reader to wonder what the justices say they are
disagreeing about in the cases that produce the patterns seen in the graphs.
I want to shed light on those questions by looking briefly at some recent
examples of types of disagreements that arise in both sorts of cases, consti
tutional and nonconstitutional. The initial idea behind this study was that the
Court's constitutional and nonconstitutional cases involve different interpre
tive issues. On inspection this turns out to be only partly true. Certain types
of issues often come to the fore in both sorts of cases. The discussion that
follows catalogues some of them using criminal cases that the Court has
decided in recent years. We will examine how the following types of argu
ments can determine the outcomes of constitutional and statutory cases
alike: disputes about interest balancing, about the content of "common
sense," about how much to trust juries, and about how to interpret ambigu
ous prior cases-by reference to their holdings or to their rationales. We
also will look at a few common types of textual argument that work in a
similar way but tend to arise more often in statutory than in constitutional
cases. Each of these mechanisms will be illustrated with brief descriptions
of recent cases. After a while the mortal reader will have trouble keeping all
the cases straight, but that doesn't matter. The important thing is to remem
ber the large point that all of the examples mean to illustrate-namely, that
each of these types of argument is a way that a judge's priors can be turned
into a legal argument, and that most of them cut across constitutional and
statutory settings. Still more examples could be developed, but these are
among the most common and will be enough to provide a solid sense of
why the graphs at the start of this paper look they way they do.
For the sake of concision I will refer to the current justices in two
groups: hawks, who consist of Rehnquist, Thomas, Scalia, Kennedy, and
O'Connor; and doves, who consist of Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens.
These groupings will make it easier to describe the lineups that the decisions
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produced; and a glance back at Chart

1

will show a large drop-off between

the last of the current hawks (Kennedy) and the first of the current doves
(Souter). The court makes many 5-4 decisions that follow this division, as
the discussion that follows will illustrate.
To the cases and mechanisms:

1. Interest balancing. The disputes in criminal cases,

as in cases of other

types, often involve trade-offs between costs and benefits of different
sorts-"interest balancing" of one kind or another.
a. Constitutional example. In Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole
15
v. Scott, the question was whether illegally seized evidence could be con
sidered at parole revocation hearings. Both sides balanced the costs and
benefits of excluding the evidence. The hawks said that applying the exclu
sionary rule would hinder the functioning of the parole system and only
minimally deter police misconduct. The doves said that the majority exag
gerated the trouble the exclusionary rule would cause in parole hearings and
underestimated the benefits it would create in inducing the police to behave
better. The decision was five to four in favor of the state.
16
b. Statutory example. In Calderon v. Thompson, Thompson was con
victed of murder and sought habeas corpus. After various proceedings in
federal court, the Ninth Circuit denied all relief. Two days before Thomp
son's execution date, the en bane court of appeals recalled its mandate and
granted relief after all. The court said that internal procedural errors (for
example, a law clerk's mishandling of the papers in the case) had prevented
it from acting earlier. The warden appealed. The question was whether the
Ninth Circuit had abused its discretion by recalling its mandate at the last
minute. The majority-the hawks-held that it had, and thus found for the
warden: the state's interests in finality were compelling, especially once the
federal courts had said they were finished with the case. "It would be the
rarest of cases where the negligence of two judges in expressing their views

is sufficient grounds to frustrate the interests of a State of some 32 million
persons in enforcing a final judgment in its favor."17 A recall of the mandate
in these circumstances could only be justified to avoid a "miscarriage of
justice"-a standard that "accommodates the need to allow courts to remedy

actual injustice while recognizing that, at some point, the State must be al
lowed to exercise its sovereign power to punish offenders." 18 The doves
dissented:
[H]owever true it is that the en bane rehearing process cannot effectively
function to review every three-judge panel that arguably goes astray in a
particular case, surely it is nonetheless reasonable to resort to en bane cor-

15.

524 U.S. 357 (1998).

16.

523 U.S. 538 (1998).

17.

Id. at 552.

18.

Id. at 558 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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rection that may be necessary to avoid a constitutional error standing be
tween a life sentence and an execution. 19

c. Analysis. It is easy to understand why arguments about costs and
benefits would lead to predictable splits that cut across constitutional and
statutory cases. To say that judges balance costs and benefits is close to say
ing directly that they are giving effect to their preferences. The arguable
difference is that judges do not say their own preferences are the ones they
are enforcing; they say they are balancing the values found in the law. Thus
in Scott, the instruction to balance deterrence and administrative costs had
been given in prior cases discussing where to apply the exclusionary rule.
Yet it still fell to the judges to decide how much weight goes into each of the
pans; in Scott this meant making estimates of how much trouble the exclu
sionary rule would cause in the parole system and how much it would deter
bad behavior by the police. Here, as elsewhere, the case law is better at call
ing for balancing than at explaining how it should be done, a task left to the
justices to carry out as they see fit.
Any of several things might be occurring when judges disagree about
the outcome of such an exercise. They might differ over the probable conse
quences of various rulings they could make, or they might agree about the
likely results but disagree in their evaluation of them. In Scott the disagree
ment seemed empirical. One can imagine the research of academics being
used to resolve such uncertainties, but the Court rarely repairs to that source
of guidance, whether because the justices lack confidence in their ability to
evaluate it competently, because the data are thought inconclusive, or be
cause professional norms call for a decision explained in the language of
law rather than policy. Perhaps arguing about social science research makes
20
the Court's work look too much for comfort like the work of a legislature.
Instead, other methods evidently are used to fill the gaps, the most ready of
them being recourse to the judge's own imagination. The fund of impres
sions from which these thoughts are drawn is internal, so the results end up

19.

Id. at 569 (Souter, J., dissenting).

20. See Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent Adjudication and
Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733
(2000). The authors argue that while more consideration and discussion of social research by judges
may not constrain them, "it will improve the quality of the Court's decision-making in constitutional

Id. at
794. For more discussion of the judicial resistance to such research, see William Twining et al., The
Role of Academics in the Legal System, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 920, 934
(Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003):

criminal procedure and render more transparent and open to criticism the Court's opinions."

[J]udges who do attempt to take academic work into account may find it hard to distinguish the

good from the bad, or to apply the good work competently once it is found. A judge who ad
mits that academic scholarship influenced his decision invites ridicule from judicial
colleagues. who will cite this as evidence that his position is flimsy: or from the academy,
which may be quick to complain if a court relies on work that turns out to be flawed, or inap
posite, or that the judge fumbled in trying to apply.... Most courts would still be more
comfortable citing an obscure judicial opinion from another jurisdiction than a hundred-page
law review article as support for a holding.
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colored by the judges' priors about the world-which players in a criminal
drama should be trusted a little more or a little less, how slowly or quickly
to assume that a defendant probably is guilty, how much trouble it would be
to exclude evidence from a parole hearing, how bad it would be if the pa
rolee got away because of it, and so on. Maybe the judges try to put
themselves in the position of each of the players and find some of the efforts
easier than others, or maybe they fall back on mental pictures acquired from
anecdotes, novels, or movies. The point in any event is that many of the
Court's decisions involve empirical guesswork that draws mostly on the jus
tices' own views of the world, which are constant across different types of
cases.
Calderon v. Thompson seemed to involve less empirical disagreement
and more dispute about how to weigh various consequences that everyone
could see. A decision either way had obvious costs. Allowing the mandate to
be recalled delayed Thompson's execution. Not allowing it deprived
Thompson of some small chance that a flaw would be found in his convic
tion. The hawks were preoccupied with the first worry:
Only with real finality can the victims of crime move forward knowing the
moral judgment will be carried out. To unsettle these expectations is to in
flict a profound injury to the powerful and legitimate interest in punishing
21
the guilty, an interest shared by the State and the victims of crime alike.

The doves worried more about the other part of the case, the thought that
there always is time for another look at someone's conviction before execut
ing him. Here, as in Scott, there were authorities saying that both
considerations matter but nothing to tell judges how to balance them. They
decide for themselves, though the judgment may take the form of a decision
about which authorities to treat as crucial. Thus the hawks said they weren't
22
making up their preferences but were finding them in the AEDPA; though
the statute hadn't been violated, they said it was important for the values
behind it to inform their thinking about what the Ninth Circuit had done.
The doves thought the AEDPA had nothing to do with the case.
2. Common sense. Appeals to common sense (or, even more regrettably,
"commonsense") rarely are edifying but occur from time to time in cases of
all types.
23
a. Constitutional example. In Illinois v. Wardlow, Wardlow ran away
when he saw police cars approaching his neighborhood. The police thought
this suspicious; they gave chase, caught him, conducted a search, and found
drugs. The question was whether there was reasonable suspicion to support
the search. The justices all agreed that no bright line rule could determine
whether a person's flight gave the police good ground to search him. It
21.

Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. at 556 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

22. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 1 10 Stat.
1 2 1 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.), discussed more fully infra S ection
III.5.
23.

528 U.S. 119 (2000).
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depended on all the circumstances. But they disagreed about whether the
particular search of Wardlow was lawful. The majority-the hawks-said
the determination had to be based "on commonsense judgments and infer
ences about human behavior,"24 and concluded that here the suspicions of
the police were reasonable (in addition to Wardlow's flight, he was in a bad
neighborhood). The doves dissented, arguing that there weren't enough
other facts in the picture to make Wardlow's flight suspicious.
25
b. Statutory example. In Ohler v. United States, Ohler was tried on drug
charges. She already had a prior conviction for a drug offense, and the gov
ernment sought to use it to impeach her at trial. Over Ohler's objections the
court said at the start of the trial that it would allow the evidence. Ohler's
lawyer then brought up the prior conviction during her direct testimony; he
wanted to put it before the jury voluntarily rather than let the government
draw it out on cross-examination. Ohler was convicted. She appealed the
trial judge's decision to admit the evidence of the prior conviction. The
question was whether she waived the right to complain about it by voluntar
ily admitting the conviction in her own testimony. Ohler tried to base her
argument on the logic of Federal Rule of Evidence

609,

but the precise

question in the case-whether she had forfeited her right to complain-was
a matter of judge-made federal law. The hawks held for the government, five
to four, finding the issue waived; they adhered to the "commonsense princi
ple" that "a party introducing evidence cannot complain on appeal that the
6
evidence was erroneously admitted."2 The doves dissented, saying that "the
common sense that approves the rule also limits its reach to a point well
short of this case."27
c. Analysis. An appeal to common sense seems to mean the judge is re
porting what seems obvious. It may be empirical: obviously someone who
runs away from the police in a bad neighborhood is behaving suspiciously.
Or it may involve notions of fairness, perhaps with some underlying notion
of costs and benefits behind it: obviously someone who voluntarily puts evi
dence in front of a jury can't complain later about the court's decision to
admit it. In either event, appeals to common sense only are compelling
when the sense of the situation really is common. Otherwise they are likely

just to express each side's vague priors about what sort of behavior or infer

ences make sense to them personally, which again will be bound up with
their private understandings of the world; thus Einstein's suggestion that
common sense consists of the prejudices one has developed before the age
of eighteen. It is circular, and ought to be considered an embarrassment, to
invoke common sense as a source of authority in a case where the sense of

24.

Id. at 125.

25.

529 U.S. 753 (2000).

26.

Id. at 755.

27.

Id. at 762 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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28
the situation is precisely what is contested. But the important point for us
is that whatever common sense may be, it comes from the judge and cuts
across cases involving different underlying legal issues.

3.

Estimates ofjuries. Sometimes a case will call for guesses about how

a jury should be expected to react to an instruction or piece of evidence. The
resulting disagreements may reflect empirical judgments or disagreements
about the substance of the standard being applied-that is, how much risk of
various sorts of error ought to be tolerated.
a. Constitutional example. In Kyles v. Whitley,

29

Kyles was convicted of

murder. It later came out that the state failed to disclose some evidence that
was favorable to him. The issue was whether the evidence was material un
30
in concrete form the question was whether

der United States v. Bagley;

there was a reasonable probability that the evidence would have led to a dif
ferent outcome if it had been turned over. The majority-the doves, along
with O'Connor-held the standard satisfied and found for Kyles. The hawks
dissented, concluding that the evidence the prosecution withheld would not
have mattered because the evidence against Kyles already was overwhelm
ing. (Kyles may be thought an atypically factbound example of the sort of
case that usually occupies the Court; for another illustration, perhaps more
typical, see the discussion of Gray v. Maryland below. 31)
32
b. Statutory example. In Old Chief v. United States, the defendant was
convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. At trial he offered to
stipulate that he previously had committed a felony, but the government de
clined the stipulation because it wanted to tell the jury about his earlier
crime in detail; the question was whether the government had the right to so
insist on making its case. The law on point was Federal Rule of Evidence

403,

which calls for the exclusion of evidence "if its probative value is sub

stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . ." 33The justices
disagreed about whether a jury would likely be prejudiced by hearing the
details of the prior crime. The majority-the doves and Justice Kennedy
thought so, and held that the defendant's stipulation had to be accepted. The
remaining hawks thought otherwise, saying that "[a]ny incremental harm
resulting from proving the name or basic nature of the prior felony can be
properly mitigated by limiting jury instructions. " 34 (The dissenters also
added, naturally enough, that the majority's view "defies common sense." 3)5

28.

For more discussion, see Meares & Harcourt, supra note 20, at 783-84.

29.

5 14 U.S. 419 (1995).

30.

473 U.S. 667 ( 1 985).

31.

See infra Section ill. 4.a.

32.

5 19 U.S. 1 72 (1997).

33.

FED. R. Evm. 403.

34.

Id. at 196 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

35.

Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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c. Analysis. Some judges tend to look at evidence wrongfully shown to a
jury and conclude that it probably didn't make any difference (or they con
clude that evidence wrongfully kept from a jury probably wouldn't have
mattered). The good evidence, or the evidence the jury did see, was too con
clusive for the disputed evidence to have affected the outcome. Other judges
are more inclined to think the evidence could have mattered. Again there are
two ways to look at this.· One-is that the judges imagine being jurors and ask
whether the evidence would have mattered to them. This may not be quite
what any judge wants to do; he wants to know whether a jury would have
cared, not whether he would have cared. But it's hard to separate the issues,
especially when most of the justices rarely if ever have participated in
criminal trials in any capacity. To the extent a judge can't perform the sepa
ration, he will give effect to his own sense of the world. Every lawyer knows
that some jurors are more likely than others to find defendants guilty; the
same goes for judges when they imagine being jurors in order to decide
whether an error made a difference. The reasons for the variation may in
volve priors about the likelihood that a defendant is guilty, or about whether
a bad childhood mitigates crimes a defendant committed later, or about
whether the credibility of a witness against the defendant is damaged by the
revelation that he was a paid informant, given that he already was known to
36
have a criminal record. These lowly sorts of judgments work their way into
the Court's larger legal decisions with some regularity. They owe nothing to
interpretative philosophy.
Another possibility is that the justices roughly agree about the likelihood
that the evidence would have mattered but disagree about the resulting legal
significance. As Kyles illustrates, the standards in these cases tend to be
drawn in terms such as whether there is a "reasonable probability" that some
piece of evidence would have affected the trial or did affect it. There is room
for variation within the standard; even if two judges agree that the likelihood
that something mattered was one in three, they may disagree on whether the
standard was satisfied; we know it requires an error that "undermines confi
37
dence in the outcome of the trial," but thresholds of confidence may be
distributed quite unevenly between judges. Judges more worried about final
ity naturally will tend to interpret such standards to create a high bar, just as
judges intolerant of inaccuracy will read vague legal standards to be intoler
ant of it, too. As suggested earlier, the extent of the intolerance might be part
of a judge's private sense of the world, or it might be a general inference he
draws from the Constitution or from other legal materials. In either event the
answers don't come from interpretation of the materials at stake in the cases
themselves.
Much the same general analysis applies to disagreements about whether
jurors can be trusted to follow instructions. It isn't a distinctively legal in36.

See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004).

37. Kyles v. Whitley, 5 1 4 U.S. 419, 434 ( 1 995) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
667, 678 (1985)).
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quiry. Everyone agrees that the law usually has to assume jurors obey their
instructions (the system couldn't function otherwise), and everyone knows
there are times when the assumption isn't safe. When judges have to decide
whether a case fits the rule or the exception they again may be tempted to
imagine whether they themselves would have trouble following the instruc

tion. This might seem an odd explanation, however, since the judges who
seem least friendly to defendants are the ones most likely to be sure that
jurors will obey their instructions and not penalize the defendant unfairly.

So maybe the views judges take of the question really depend on how cheer
ful a picture they carry of the typical juror: as obedient, careful, and fair
minded, or as lazy, fearful of criminals, and casual in following instructions.
Or perhaps the explanation is the other type we have been developing:
judges aren't so much thinking differently about jurors as tolerating differ
ent levels of risk. Thus Old Chief involved the risk that some jurors, in spite

of their instructions, will take a worse view of a defendant after hearing
about terrible crimes he committed in the past. Judges who agree about the
chance that this will happen might disagree about how much to care about
it. If one jury in ten is turned against a defendant when it hears of his record,

is it too many? The sources of legal guidance never say. They speak blandly
of balancing and delegate the details to judges to make by their own lights.

4. Interpreting case law. Both constitutional and statutory cases, of
course, sometimes involve disputes over how to read

ri

recedents.
a. Constitutional example. In Gray v. Maryland, 8 Gray and a codefen

dant were tried for murder. The codefendant didn't testify, but he had given
a confession earlier and a detective read it to the jury. The confession impli
cated Gray, so whenever the detective reached Gray's name he said
"deleted." The question was whether this violated Gray's rights under the
39

confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. In Bruton v. United States,

the Court had held for a defendant on facts similar to Gray's but where the
one defendant had been named explicitly in the confession of the other. In
40
Richardson v. Marsh, the Court had held for the state on slightly different
facts: the defendant wasn't mentioned in his codefendant's confession, but
when the confession was combined with other evidence the jury still might

have figured out that the first defendant had been involved in the crime. The

Court said the confession was admissible if accompanied by limiting in

structions, since the inference harmful to the defendant only arose when put

together with other evidence. The question in Gray's case was how his trial
compared with those in Bruton and Richardson.
The majority-the doves along with Justice O'Connor-held for Gray:

Richardson

must depend in significant part upon the

ple fact of, inference.

Richardson's

38.

523 U.S. 185 (1998).

39.

391 U.S. 123 ( 1 968).

40.

48 1 U.S. 200 ( 1 987).

kind

of, not the sim

inferences involved statements that did
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not refer directly to the defendant himself and which became incriminating
"only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial." The inferences
at issue here involve statements that, despite redaction, obviously refer di
rectly to someone, often obviously the defendant, and which involve
inferences that a jury ordinarily could make immediately, even were the
confession the very first item introduced at trial. ...

Richardson provided in support of its con
Richardson expressed concern lest application of

Nor are the policy reasons that
clusion applicable here.

Bruton's

rule apply where "redaction" of confessions, particularly "confes

sions incriminating by connection," would often "not [be] possible,"
thereby forcing prosecutors too often to abandon use either of the confes
sion or of a joint trial. Additional redaction of a confession that uses a
blank space, the word "delete," or a symbol, however, normally is possi
41
ble.

The remaining hawks dissented:
We declined in

Richardson . . .

to extend

Bruton

to confessions that in

criminate only by inference from other evidence. When incrimination is
inferential, "it is a less valid generalization that the jury will not likely
obey the instruction to disregard the evidence." Today the Court struggles
to decide whether a confession redacted to omit the defendant's name is
incriminating on its face or by inference. ... The Court's analogizing of
"deleted" to a physical description that clearly identifies the defendant
(which we have assumed

250, 253 (1969))

U.S.
ing,"

we

have

Bruton

meant

introduced at trial.42

Gray

covers, see

Harrington v. California, 395

does not survive scrutiny. By "facially incriminat
incriminating independent

of

other

evidence

also shows how the themes we are cataloguing often may be com

bined. Here we see a dispute about how to read prior cases and also a
familiar disagreement about when jurors are likely to obey instructions.
b.

Statutory example. In Lee v. Kemna,43

Lee's alibi witnesses disap

peared without explanation on the day he was supposed to put on his
defense at trial. The Missouri trial court refused to grant a continuance; Lee
was convicted of murder. The state court of appeals said the trial court was
right to deny the continuance because Lee hadn't complied with procedural
rules requiring the motion to be in writing. Then Lee sought federal habeas

corpus. The district and appellate courts held it unavailable because he had
lost in state court on state law grounds: the technical blunders that the state

court of appeals cited. The Supreme Court had interpreted the habeas corpus
statute44 as forbidding relief for prisoners held under judgments that rest on

41.

Gray, 523 U.S. at 196 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).

42.

Id. at 201 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).

43.

534 U.S. 362 (2002).

44.

28 u.s.c. § 2254 (2005).
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4
"adequate and independent state grounds"; 5 the question was whether Mis
souri's judgment fit that description.
The Court had addressed this sort of question before, so the more pre
cise issue for decision was how Lee's facts compared to those in another
case,

Osborne v. Ohio.46

Osborne was convicted of possessing child pornog

raphy. He had objected to the jury instructions in the trial court but then
failed to renew the objections when he should have. The Supreme Court
held that this was not an independent state ground that prevented him from
complaining about the instructions on habeas corpus, because the state trial
court had known the substance of Osborne's complaint even if he hadn't
complied with all of its rules. That was enough to satisfy the policies behind
the federal rule against letting prisoners raise claims that the state courts
rejected for their own internal reasons. Was Lee's case essentially the same?
The majority thought so, and found for Lee; Thomas, Scalia and Kennedy
disagreed. There was a long debate over the meaning of the

Osborne

case.

Said the dissenters:

Osborne might appear to support the major
Osborne's holding does not.

T hough isolated statements in
ity's approach . . .

. . . The majority's [decision] exaggerates the importance of certain lan
guage employed by the

Osborne Court.

We did take note of the "sequence

of events," but only because in all overbreadth cases, Ohio procedure man
dated

a

sequence

whereby

defendants

were

required

to

predict

unforeseeable limiting constructions before they were adopted or to lodge
objections foreclosed by previous rulings. We also mentioned the trial's
brevity, but that fleeting reference was not only unnecessary but also in

Osborne Court's analysis. The adequacy doctrine would
47
have dictated the same result, brief trial or no.
tension with the

The majority read

Osborne

differently:

As attentive reading of the relevant pages of

Osborne

will confirm, we

here rely not on "isolated statements" from the opinion, but solidly on its
analysis and holding on "the adequacy of state procedural bars to the asser
tion of federal questions."
. . . [T ]he dissent views as central to

Osborne

the "unforeseeab[ility]" of

the Ohio Supreme Court's limiting construction of the child pornography
statute at issue there,

i.e. ,

that court's addition of the "lewdness" element

on which Osborne failed to request a jury charge. The dissent here is char
acteristically inventive.

Osborne spoke not

of the predictability

vel non

of

the Ohio Supreme Court's construction; instead, this Court asked whether
anything "would be gained by requiring Osborne's lawyer to object a

45.

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 768 (1991).

46.

495 U.S. 103 (1990).

47. Lee, 534 U.S. at 396, 399 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Osborne, 495 U.S. at 12324) (citations omitted).
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second time" on the question of lewdness, and answered that question with
48

a firm "no."

c.

Analysis.

Judges often have to choose between two general ap

proaches when called on to apply a prior decision: adhering as closely as
possible to the verbal formulation of its holding in the prior case or giving
effect to its rationale. Or they may have to choose between multiple ration
ales the earlier opinion offered. These possibilities can lead to different
results, and nothing in law guides the choice between them; either is within
the bounds of custom, and no decision a judge makes about which approach
to use in one case binds him to do the same in the next. S ometimes everyone
can agree on the right choice because the considerations are lopsided. But in
cases where it's close-where maybe the rationale is present or maybe it
isn't, or where the formal statement of the rule from the first case leaves a
little room to question its fit in the second one-where should a judge look
for guidance? There really is nothing to consider but his own immediate
perception of which makes more sense, and this will trade heavily on intui
tions about the underlying policies at stake. (Another possibility is that
judges give grudging readings to earlier cases they think were wrongly de
cided on interpretive grounds, and generous readings to decisions they like;
this then pushes the question back to the earlier case and why
as it was.)

5.

Statutory arguments.

it was

decided

Our catalogue of ways in which judges' priors

can be given effect should include an important family of mechanisms lim
ited to nonconstitutional cases: arguments about how to read statutory texts.
Here the best case studies are the Court's readings of the Antiterrorism and
49
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1 996 ("AEDPA"), the principal point of
which was to change the rules governing federal habeas corpus. The Court's
decisions interpreting the statute are remarkable for the regularity of the
justices' votes in them despite the different legal issues involved. Occasion
0
ally the Court votes unanimously, 5 but its nonunanimous cases often have
been decided five to four with little change in the composition of the major
ity or the dissenters: the hawks vote for the government while the doves,
perhaps with Kennedy or O'Connor, vote for the prisoner. 5 1 Sometimes there

48.

Id. at 378-79 (quoting Osborne, 495 U.S. at 1 23-25) (citations omitted).

49. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1 996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 1 10 Stat.
1 214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
50. See, e.g., Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003); Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4
(2000); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000); Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740 (1998).
51.
Of the first eleven nonunanimous cases the Court decided under the AEDPA (which were
the ones examined for this Part of the Article), four were decided five to four: Carey v. Saffold, 536
U.S. 2 1 4 (2002) (five to four for the prisoner); Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001) (five to four for
the warden); Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998) (five to four for the prisoner); Lindh v.
Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 ( 1 997) (five to four in favor of the p risoner). Also decided five to four, though
a bit later in time, were Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 62 (2003) (five to four for the warden), and
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004) (five to four for the warden; while this case arose
under the AEDPA, it did not principally involve the interpretation of it).
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are departures from this pattern, as where fewer than all of the hawks vote
for the government52 or where fewer than all of the doves vote for the pris
oner. 5 3 But there has not yet been an AEDPA case where a hawk voted for a
4
state prisoner while a dove voted for the government. 5
What makes this result even more remarkable is that the AEDPA cases

tend not to follow any of the patterns discussed above. On their face, at

least, they usually don't involve disputes about how to weigh costs and
benefits or guesses at how a jury would react to evidence. They involve

statutory interpretation in a simpler and more classic sense: the justices are

confronted with a chunk of text and questions about its meaning. They en
gage in heated arguments about

Webster 's Third,

about the importance of

giving effect to all the words in the statute, about the best view of the stat

ute's purpose, and so forth-and then, as we shall now see, they vote with
striking predictability. (In principle, of course, these same sorts of argumen
tative moves can arise in constitutional cases, but as a practical matter they
come up far more often in cases involving statutes.)
a.

Textual arguments.

In

55
Hohn v. United States

the district court held

against the prisoner; he sought permission to appeal from a circuit judge,
which was denied. The question was whether the request for permission
amounted to a case in the court of appeals that the Supreme Court could
review. The doves invoked the definition of "case" from one of the Court's
6
prior opinions 5 while the dissenters said that an application for a certificate
of appealability "does not have the requisite qualities of a legal 'case' under
any known definition." 57 In Carey v. Saffold the majority-the doves-relied
on

Webste r 's Third to conclude that the state's reading of the word "pend
ing" was "not consistent with that word's ordinary meaning." 85 The hawks

argued that this view found no real support from

Webster 's,

properly under

stood, and that the really important word in the case was "application"-

52. See, e.g., Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) (seven to two for the prisoner, with
Scalia and Thomas dissenting); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (six to three for the pris
oner, with Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas dissenting); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637
( 1 998) (seven to two for the prisoner, with Scalia and Thomas dissenting).
53. See, e.g., Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003) (six to three for the warden, with
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter dissenting); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (200 1 ) (seven to two for
the warden, with Breyer and Ginsburg dissenting); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 ( 1 999) (six
to three for the warden, with Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens dissenting).
54. For almost the whole first decade under the AEDPA, no hawk voted for a prisoner of any
sort-state or federal-in any case where a dove voted for the government; but just as this article
was going to press, a single outflanking at last occurred: in Johnson v. United States, 1 25 S. Ct.
1 57 1 (2005), Justice Souter was in a five to four majority in favor of the federal government, while
Justice Scalia was among the dissenters.
55.

524 U.S. 236 (1998).

56. Id. at 241 ("[T]he words 'case' and 'cause' are constantly used as synonyms in statutes
. . . , each meaning a proceeding in court, a suit, or action." (quoting Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 5 8 1 , 595 ( 1 872))).
57.

Id. at 256 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

58.

536 U.S. 2 1 4, 2 1 9 (2002).
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which they thought should be defined by prior case law and by looking at its
usage elsewhere in the statute. In

Stewart v. Martinez- Villareal the majority
9
defined "second or successive" by looking at case law, 5 while Scalia and
Thomas relied on

Webster's

the warden should win.

60

In

and on

Black 's Law Dictionary to conclude that
Duncan v. Walker, where the issue concerned

grammar rather than definitions, the majority said that its reading was pref
61
erable because it avoided treating any of the statute's words as surplusage.
The dissent objected that the majority's reading required "either an unusual
6
intonation . . . or a slight rewrite of the language." 2
b.

The purpose of the statute.

It is standard for each side to claim its

reading better effects the purpose of the statute. Thus in

States

Hohn v. United

the hawks (without Kennedy) complained that the majority had

"achieve[d] a result that is fundamentally at odds with the purpose of the
6
statute"; 3that purpose, generally speaking, "was to eliminate the intermina
ble delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, and the
shameful overloading of our federal criminal justice system, produced by
64
various aspects of this Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence." Carey v. Saf

fold and Duncan v. Walker both

involved the interpretation of § 2244(d)(2);

different majorities in the two cases explained that the purpose of the provi
sion was to advance the causes of "comity, finality, and federalism" by
promoting "the exhaustion of state remedies while respecting the interest in
6
the finality of state court judgments." 5 In Duncan the majority said that its
reading was necessary to achieve those goals, but the dissenters-Breyer
and Ginsburg-said the majority's holding undercut another purpose of the
statute: "to grant state prisoners a fair and reasonable time to bring a first
66
federal habeas corpus petition." In O 'Sullivan v. Boerckel everyone a reed
that interests of "comity " were meant to be served by § 2254(d)(2), 7 but

�

they couldn't agree about whether this meant that prisoners should be re
quired to bring every one of their claims to a state's supreme court before
68
trying for relief in federal court.
c.

Consequences.

Each side often says the other side's reading is im

plausible because it leads to bad consequences; each denies that its own
reading would create similar problems. Thus in
59.

523 U.S. 637, 644 (1998).

60.

Id. at 649 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

61.

533 U.S. 167, 174-75 (2001).

62.

Id. at 187 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

63.

524 U.S. 236, 257 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

64.

Id. at 264-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Carey v. Saffold the question

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 222 (2002) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. at 178,
65.
and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000)); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. at 178 (quoting
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 436).
66.

Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. at 191 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

67.

28 u.s.c. § 2254(d)(2) (2005).

68.

526 U.S. 838 (1999).
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was whether the time for filing a federal petition was tolled while the pris
oner applied for an original writ in the state supreme court. The hawks said
this would lead to a "strange anomaly" in cases where a prisoner's federal
petition appeared to be too late-unless he went back to the state supreme
court and filed a new original petition there, in which case all the time that
passed since his last appearance in state court might then be treated as
tolled. The doves were untroubled: the state was free to change its rules if
those consequences were unwelcome. The same style of argument also was
prominent in

Stewart

v.

Martinez-Villareal.

A prisoner's claim that he was

incompetent to be executed was dismissed as premature because he had no
execution date; once he got one, the question was whether he could return to
federal court to have the claim heard. The doves (and three hawks) said that
a negative answer would lead to perverse consequences since it would mean
that a petitioner whose claim was dismissed for any trivial reason would
never be able to have the claim heard. Scalia and Thomas were unmoved: on
their view, since the right to have one's claim heard is not given by nature
since, indeed, the right to challenge anything more than the jurisdiction of
the convicting court was a judicial invention-the deprivation of such rights,
even if on trivial grounds, should not be considered perverse.
d.

Analysis. It sometimes is thought that the Supreme Court is riven by

disputes between textualists and those who prefer a freer reading of a statu
tory text to give effect to its purposes. The cases concerning the AEDPA, at
least, do not follow this pattern or any other consistent line of dispute over
method. In none of them does anyone say the literal meaning of the statute
should be sacrificed to advance its purpose. Instead, both sides generally say
that theirs is the better reading of the text itself. The problem is that there
are no legal metrics available for giving priority to one such argument over
another-for saying which definition trumps which when one is from a dic
tionary, another from case law, and another from "ordinary meaning"; for
saying what to do when two views of a statute's purposes conflict; or for
deciding whether a consequence of a reading is perverse or absurd. These all
are qualitative or even aesthetic judgments left to the judges. They are sup
posed to call them like they see them, but how they see them evidently is
colored by their background view of what outcome of the case makes best
sense; as between two readings of a sentence or word, both plausible on
their surface, the one that gives defendants another try at judicial review will
tend to seem counterintuitive and unlikely to someone convinced that de
fendants get more than enough tries already-either as a matter of personal
opinion or (if it is any different) because he thinks the mood of the Constitu
tion has something general to say about the question. This is only a
conjecture about how the justices do their work; but while it can't be proven,
it fits the facts.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS
It might seem that the justices simply grab onto whatever arguments
help the side they prefer on grounds they brought to the case from outside
its four comers, whether they are styled as policy preferences or something
fancier. In effect they may do something like that, but the examples just re
viewed suggest a bit more to say about how the process works. The striking
feature of the disputes just surveyed is how little most of them have to do
with law, at least as conventionally understood (for example, collisions of
interpretive theory)-and yet how rarely they involve confessed policymak
ing, either. Instead they routinely seem to involve disagreements that I will
call quasi-factual. They are framed as disputes over the meaning or applica
tion of law, but legal materials tum out to provide little guidance for their
resolution and they easily end up expressing the judge's own controversial
opinion about what result in the case makes most sense.
It will be easier to understand this process if we step back and examine
how disagreements arise in the first place. In every case the justices are pre
sented with an array of arguments. Their job is to pick the best ones. The
range of choices is bounded by law and custom. As a matter of customary
understanding there is such a thing as a good textual argument and a bad
one, and sometimes it is clear to everyone which is which. Or sometimes the
customs and norms of the business make it clear to all that a particular tex
tual argument offered by one side is too strong to be overcome by a
particular appeal to consequences made by the other, or vice versa. Many of
these customs are cultural and owe little to law; others are the sorts of norms
into which lawyers are immersed through education and professional life. In
any event, sometimes those sources of guidance are clear enough to create
unanimity-to enable judges to agree about questions of interpretation de
spite conflicting priors. Other times they aren't, because some combination
of lack of clarity in the law 's directions on the one hand and the force of the
judges' priors on the other makes it impossible for the former to constrain
the latter. The judges end up confronted with arguments for each side that
seem plausible; and while the customs of language and law are helpful in
defining arguments as plausible or implausible, they are far less help in
picking between them after that threshold is cleared. There are a few legal
ideas to help referee such contests, such as the argument that the plain
meaning of a provision should be held more important than its purpose even
where both are plausible sources of argument, but those rules of thumb are
controversial, small in number, and tum out to be less useful than adver
tised. Even if adopted they are incomplete; they can't gain traction until
their users supply some inputs-judgments about the clarity of the text or its
purpose, for example, that trigger the theory's operation. When those judg
ments are disputed, the guidance offered by law again runs out.
The choice between plausible arguments confronts judges with uncer
tainties that legal materials and customs are too weak to resolve. The
uncertainties may be empirical, such as whether the police usefully would
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be deterred by a ruling for the defendant or whether a person who runs from
the police probably is guilty of something. They may be uncertainties about
costs and benefits and how to weigh them-for example the cost of another
reprieve for a prisoner on death row and the size of the benefit produced by
giving his claims another round of review. They may be uncertainties best
described as methodological (though since they tend to involve perception,
rather than appeals to any general principles, I have suggested that they
might as well be labeled aesthetic): whether to focus on the verbal statement
of the holding of a prior case or on its rationale; whether to define words by
using a dictionary or by consulting prior cases; or whether to regard some
possible consequence of a decision as ridiculous. Where the legal materials
bearing on these types of questions are inconclusive, there is little to do but
pick the way out that sounds best, line up the arguments that support it, and
denounce the other side for being obtuse. Since those judgments about what
sounds best are not much disciplined by the legal materials, their makers try
for congruence with some other template, and indeed with the only one at
hand-their own sense of whether the result seems reasonable, which cuts
across cases involving different legal questions.
On this view it helps to think of judging as less like philosophizing and
more as a workaday task marked by familiar cognitive hazards. P sycholo
gists have spent a lot of time studying how people carry out tasks where
they are supposed to evaluate one variable of a situation while another exerts
pressure in the background. In the most charming of the experiments a
group of American students is shown film of an interview with a professor
69
from Europe. The students are told to judge his accent. Those who watch
him speaking in a "warm" guise tend to judge his accent favorably; those
who see him saying rude, disagreeable things like his accent much less. The
payoff of the study and others like it is twofold. Qualitative judgments often
are affected by how well they serve other preferences held by their makers;
and their makers often will be unaware of this. Judges are in a similar situa
tion when they pronounce on the quality of competing arguments in a case
and then write opinions to explain why they voted as they did. Often they
can agree that an argument-the equivalent of an accent-is excellent or is
no good at all, but in a close case their legal training doesn't enable them to
avoid the tendencies that beset ordinary mortals. It just makes them profi
cient at ridiculing the professor's accent.
I have suggested that most of these disputes can be described as quasi
factual. In some cases their factual character is plain enough. Will the jury
obey its instructions? Will the police be deterred? Is a person who runs away
when the police arrive probably a crook? When appellate judges decide
these questions they make findings about the world openly or tacitly. It's a
69. Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, The Halo Effect: Evidence for Uncon
scious Alteration of Judgments, 35 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. 250 (1977). For more in the
same vein, see RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOM
INGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980), and Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy Decamp Wilson, Telling
More than We Can Know: Verbal Repons on Mental Processes, 84 PsYCHOL. REv. 231 (1977).
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funny sort of factfinding because it usually involves generalizations in the
service of legal rules rather than specific conclusions about any one case
(though we have seen some examples of the latter). On general questions of
the sort just mentioned there typically are no witnesses, and there is no def
erence given to lower courts; nor are judges often supplied with empirical
information helpful enough to displace their default tendency to rely on
what they think they know about the world. The lawyers give them stories,
claims, and fragments of data, but all usually weak enough to allow the
agreeable parts to be accepted and the rest dismissed. Again, the cognitive
psychologists have done helpful work. Anyone's default response when pre
sented with new evidence is to interpret it to conform with what they
already thought, and more determined efforts to make sense out of the data
0
do not necessarily steer them elsewhere;7 and it is natural as well for people
trying to imagine what other people think to project their own knowledge
and beliefs onto them. 7 1 The application of these tendencies to appellate
judging becomes clearer once the judges are seen to be taking evidence
rather than doing interpretation-because the interpretive task has deterio
rated into a quasi-factual dispute.

We can go a little farther still. Even the more apparently legalistic de

bates the Court engages in have strong overtones of factfinding. 72 Whether

the purpose of a statute should trump its plain meaning is a question of law,
but deciding whether it

has a plain

meaning, or what that meaning might be,

has more in common with factfinding than with legal interpretation as those
two activities usually are imagined. Of course, the rightful classification of
such questions as fact or law will depend on why we ask. They may seem
legal from an ontological standpoint or in other ways;7 3 statements about
whether a plain meaning exists may not be provably true or false, may be
general rather than specific, and may be suited for a judge rather than a jury,
all of which are features normally associated with matters of law. But if we
are concerned only with how judges resolve close questions and with what
attendant hazards, those distinctions between law and fact lose practical
force. Deciding whether the meaning of a bunch of words is plain, or
whether the expressio unius inference is strong enough to overcome con
trary indications from the purpose of the statute or elsewhere, generally will
not involve the application of settled rules or standards or be amenable to
70. See John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling Ef
fects, 44 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL . 20 (1983); Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing
of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 41 1 (1992); Charles G.
Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude PolarilJltion: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subse
quently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PE RSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979); Timothy D.
Wilson & Jonathan W. Schooler, Thinking Too Much: Introspection Can Reduce the Quality of
Preferences and Decisions, 60 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 8 1 (1991 ).
7 1 . See Raymond S. Nickerson, How We Know-and Sometimes Misjudge-What Others
Know: Imputing One 's Own Knowledge to Others, 125 PsYCHOL. BULL. 737 (1999).
72.
See Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1769 (2003). Cf Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 859 (1992).
73.

See RICHARD A. POSNE R, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 198 (1990).
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solution through any number of hours of research or theorizing. 74 It involves
staring at a text and making declarations about its properties based on the
reader's perceptions of the thing. Sometimes everyone sees these questions
the same way, whether tht:Y would like to or not, just as all the witnesses to
a crime sometimes identify the same culprit even if they wish it weren't so.
That is what law sometimes can achieve, even at the Supreme Court; it is the
drama of adjudication, and the attitudinalists' dismissal of it-their failure to
give a plausible account of the phenomenon of unanimity-is another part

of the reason why their views have not caught on with lawyers. But of
course it frequently is true, especially at the Supreme Court, that the evi
dence turns out to be too weak to constrain its users; the fellow who did the
crime looks a little like two of the people in the lineup, or the text is open to

p

two readings. In these cases it is common for ga s in certainty to be filled in
7
by what the witness expects or wants to be true -or, in the judicial setting,

for the decision to be nonunanimous and for the votes to follow the form we

have seen here.

On this understanding of judicial disagreement the quality of the lawyer

ing in a case remains important, though perhaps not quite in the way usually
imagined. In the close cases it may not be true that the side with the better
legal argument wins (in many of them it is questionable whether such a side
exists in any useful sense); but the more plausible a lawyer's argument
seems, the better the toehold it provides for a judge to give effect to his pri
ors. Some of those five to four cases we reviewed might have been nine to
zero the other way if no lawyer had come up with an appeal to precedent, to
perverse consequences, or to the expressio unius canon plausible enough to
tum the case into a quasi-factual dispute that gave the priors of the judges
space to operate. Academics often fill a similar role. Their theories serve an
enabling function, making desired results legally plausible. Theories gain
traction because they lead to results their holders want. This helps explain
why it is so hard to find a judge or academic who holds a really counterpref

erential theory-a theory that consistently produces results they dislike as a
matter of policy.

Kinds of p riors.

It is obvious that judges bring priors to their decisions;

no one thinks a judge is a blank slate. But the traditional story is that the
priors are methodological: they are ideas about how to decide cases
theories of interpretation, beliefs about the right occasions for deference,

and other tools not meant or likely to favor any party or policy systemati
cally. My claim is different. It is that the judicial priors used to resolve close
cases are substantive: they are notions precisely about which party or policy
should prevail. At this point we should revisit the possibility that the sub
stantive priors come from the Constitution-not directly, but through

74. For an effort to start fashioning standards that might speak to some of these problems,
see Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 74 (2000) .
75. See, e.g., David F. Ross et al., Unconscious Transference and Mistaken Identity: When a
Witness Misidentifies a Familiar but Innocent Person, 79 J. APPLIED PsYCHOL. 9 1 8 (1994).
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impressions the justices have about the values in the document and their
implications for statutory cases that may seem far removed from it. Or that
the priors consist not quite of their preferences but rather of large principles
of political morality that are attractive to them, that cut across different areas
of law, and that have a more respectable pedigree than ordinary opinions
about policy. Either of these stories might seem on its face to explain why
the justices' decisionmaking patterns look so similar in statutory and consti
tutional cases: the constitutional views

inform the statutory views, or both

are informed by a common philosophy.
Suppose, for example, that we have a judge who constantly votes against
prisoners on death row regardless of the details of the legal issue involved.
Maybe it's because he has a preference for capital punishment: he thinks it
just and approves its use. Or maybe he is ambivalent about capital punish
ment but feels strongly that federal courts shouldn't meddle with the states'
attempts to impose it. This last view in tum may arise because he thinks the
meddling offends the constitutional order in some large way, or it may just
be that he thinks meddling is a waste of time. In either of these scenarios the
judge has a prior that works its way out through his decisions. The concep
tual problem lies in deciding whether the prior should be called a policy
preference or something else. An enthusiasm for capital punishment is a
pure matter of policy; affection for the prerogatives of the states also can be
considered a matter of policy, but it occurs at a different level than a taste for
capital punishment. It may reflect preferences about the law distinct from
preferences about the world. Conceivably in some cases the preference for
leaving the states alone is part of a large theory thought to be the right un
derstanding of the thrust of the Constitution or of national traditions. Some
might call this latter result a judicial philosophy.
Finding the right label for judges' priors is less interesting than the em
pirical question of how much the priors reflect the various types of
preferences just sketched. The question finally is an impossible one since
judges, like anyone, have messy interiors comprising lots of different pref
erences and values--clear and obscure, high and low, conscious and not.
But the data and cases we have seen permit a few speculations about where
on the spectrum the priors tend to lie. They suggest that the important ones
do not take the form of anything so grand as clear philosophical principles
of political morality ; nor are they likely to be drawn from other legal mate
rials in any comforting sense.
First, if the priors take either of the forms just described, where are
they? A judge holding a general theory of law that bears on a case need not
be shy about saying so, but we rarely hear any such thing in the opinions the
Court produces, whether of the majority or individual variety. Nor do we see
judges claiming to decide statutory cases by invoking ideas they say they are
importing from the Constitution. Instead they usually talk at a fairly low
level of abstraction about the consequences of deciding each way, about
what jurors probably would think about some piece of evidence, about what
the dictionary says, and so forth. Conceivably they are using theories but
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don't want to say so for some reason, perhaps because they fear it would
sound pompous. But a simpler account of why judges usually don't mention
large theories or portable constitutional notions is that they aren't using

them. Mostly they are just trying to answer the questions the cases present,

empirical or conceptual or in whatever other form they take. To this one
might reply that the large philosophies still could be doing unconscious
work; but it's not clear that an unconscious philosophy

is

a philosophy, at

least in any sense distinct from other sorts of priors a judge might hold. The

point of calling a prior philosophical is precisely that it is worked out in
careful and reflective fashion. If this were the nature of the priors that pro
duce the patterns we have observed, we should expect to see clearer
evidence than we do in the accounts the judges give of their own reasoning.
And if judges' views about philosophy or the Constitution are unconscious,
they presumably have to compete for influence with other unconscious be
liefs or desires that seem likely to be deeper and to have the advantage in
any competition for influence.
Second, it is very hard to come up with either philosophical notions or
portable constitutional ideas that explain the totality of the graphs and cases.
Recall Chart 1, which saw twenty-eight justices arrayed in smooth fashion
from those enormously likely to vote for the government to those very
unlikely to do so--with various of them occupying all points in between. It
seems doubtful that well-formed philosophies or values found in the Consti
tution come in enough varieties to explain this wide spread of behavioral
patterns. Humdrum preferences seem more likely to have that property: it
would be easy enough for a judge to care a little more than one colleague
and a little less than another about helping defendants and for these differ
ences to leave signatures over a long run of cases that look like the ones we
see in the data.

The impression is reinforced when we look at the cases themselves. A

curse of much theorizing about interpretation is that it often is based on two
or three leading cases that lend themselves well to the theorist's enterprise
cases where the interpretive issue is nicely presented and the judges say
things that can be assimilated easily enough into some elegant model. A dif
ferent sense is gained by looking at the broad run of the Court's criminal
docket: the dull little cases as well as the grand ones, and the whole variety
of them rather than a few picked for their suitability as a theorist's illustra
tions. Think of the range of questions in the cases considered earlier. They
involved whether the police can search someone just because he ran away
from them; whether a defendant can complain about a trial court's admis
sion of evidence if she then decides to put it in front of the jury herself;
whether and when a jury can be expected to follow limiting instructions;

whether a limitations period in federal court is tolled while a convict seeks

original review in a state supreme court; and whether the habeas corpus

statute applies to petitions filed before it was enacted. It is difficult to come
up with philosophies that cut across these situations and would naturally
produce nearly identical five to four votes in every one of them. And of
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course those are just five examples out of hundreds that make up the pat
terns found in the charts. Each case can be the subject of its own principled
argument, but then the question is why each judge's principles tend to work
in favor of the government to a similar extent in such a variety of settings.
The patterns may be thought to reflect different ideas about what fairness
entails, which in turn can be called a difference of principle if one is at
tached to the label. But any principle capacious enough to explain the
patterns in all those cases would likely be to be too large to have rigorous
philosophical or other theoretical content.
Finally, to whatever extent judges do make use of interpretive philoso
phies and argue about them, they have to pick out those philosophies for
themselves; and the process of picking a philosophy is similar to the other
unguided judicial choices discussed earlier and is subject to the same influ
ences. The result is that judges, like academics or any others who take an
interest in law, are most unlikely to subscribe to interpretive theories that
consistently produce outcomes they dislike in live cases. We can imagine
some gaps between a judge's choice of a theory and the same judge's less
articulate preferences about the world, but the gaps are likely to be modest.
Anyone who claims allegiance to a theory can point with pride to one or two
results it produces that are felt to be unwelcome, but if the list gets much
longer than that-if the whole balance of results tips toward the unwel
come-the theory tends to hecome unwelcome, too. To make the gaps
between theory and preference large we would need philosophical methods
robust enough to compel adherence to theories they support even when they
lead to disagreeable results. We lack methods so strong; the choice of an
interpretive theory is similar to the decision of a case where the constraining
power of the legal materials has given out because there are too many good
arguments on both sides. Of course most judges have no particular training
or aptitude for philosophy, so even if it were potentially robust it would be
surprising if it were so in the hands of those users. But it seems doubtful that
it is even potentially robust. A nonjudicial example of someone who does
have training and aptitude for philosophy is Ronald Dworkin, a well-known
champion of the idea that judges should use theories of political morality to
answer hard questions; but it has been observed that the results of his inquir
ies constantly align with the preferences of modern liberals who are not
philosophically reflective at all. 76
The choice of which general values to find in the Constitution, if sepa
rate from the quest for a philosophy to guide the decisions in criminal cases,
also seems liable to be dominated by private beliefs about which of the val
ues are attractive. Earlier I offered the image of a judge who has mixed
feelings about capital punishment but doesn't like seeing federal courts in
terfere with it. That is a plausible example of the small gap between a policy

76.
See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIEcLE) 1 27-28 ( 1 997);
Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 1 1 1 HARV. L. REv. 1 638, 1 685-86
& n.98 (1 998).
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preference and a legal one. It is more difficult, though, to imagine a judge

saying to himself, "I think the death penalty is monstrous, but since the

Constitution mentions it as a possibility I am going to err on the side of
making it

easier

for the states to impose when I interpret the habeas corpus

statute." Or: "I myself think criminal defendants get far too many chances

for review in federal court, but I'm going to read the habeas corpus statute
generously to defendants because the Constitution tells me to-not in any

place specifically, but just the whole thing generally." Neither inquiries into

philosophy nor the search for portable constitutional values are likely to

stray that much from the sense of things the judge had before the inquiries

got started (again, where are the examples?)-which means that even where
the priors a judge brings to a case do seem to be derived from other legal

sources, we have to consider what preferences lie prior to

Calderon v. Thompson.

them.

Recall

Everyone agreed that the AEDPA did not control the

case, but the warden argued that the statute's values nevertheless should in
form the Court's thinking. While the warden was not pointing to the
Constitution, he was making a claim that the justices should import values
into the case from a source of law not directly on point. The result illustrates
the likely result of such invitations. Five justices agreed with the warden that
the values of the AEDPA were relevant and required judgment for him.
Those were, of course, the same five who most often vote for the govern
ment in all sorts of other criminal cases. The other four justices, more
accustomed to voting for defendants, did not think the spirit of the AEDPA
mattered to the case and voted for the prisoner. Why do some justices so
regularly find values helpful to the government (or unhelpful to it) when
they look at materials bearing only indirectly on their cases? The obvious
answer, which has no evident competition, is that they tend to find what they
are disposed to find.
None of this allows us to say anything conclusive about where judges
get the priors they use to decide close cases. But we can say that in those

cases priors from somewhere seem to do the hard work, and there are good
grounds to doubt that the priors have rigorous philosophical content or are

otherwise very distinct from the wells of preferences from which judges
draw their views on any other questions about the world. The actual basis of
the priors seems likely to be of two possible sorts, the epistemic and the
moral. A judge might be inclined for or against the government because of
beliefs about deterrence, the social costs of crime, the risk of convicting the
innocent, and other questions on which people differ because they lack good
information about them. Or the inclinations might arise from moral views
about how hateful or sympathetic the judge finds criminal defendants. These
two types of priors might in tum influence each other, with the empirical

guesses driving the moral conclusions or the moral views causing some em
pirical guesses to seem more appealing that others. In sorting through these

speculations we may take notice that the same cleavage found between the

current justices on criminal cases also separates the ones more and less
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7
likely to vote to allow affirmative action, 7 to support federal power at the
9
78
expense of the states, to take expansive views of the establishment clause, 7
and to take various other positions that often divide the Court five to
0
four8 -issues that may involve empirical uncertainties of their own, but
none that line up in any evident way with the empirical uncertainties in the
criminal cases. The most plausible inference from these patterns is that deci
sions in the close cases are, at bottom, driven by clusters of untheorized
moral sentiments that tend to go together within a personality. But one
should not be too confident when speculating about mental processes that
cannot be directly tested or observed.

V. THE PUZZLE OF S UBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
The greatest puzzle in the data is the behavior of the justices in substan
tive criminal cases-in other words, the lineups in cases where the dispute
involves whether the defendant's original acts in the world broke the law. A
classic fount of such difficulties is

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A), which provides

stiff punishments for anyone who, "during and in relation to any crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm."8 1 If a drug
dealer barters a gun for a batch of cocaine, has he "used" a firearm in rela
tion to a drug offense? If he has a gun in the glove compartment of his truck
and a load of marijuana in the back, has he "carried" a firearm in relation to
a drug offense? Questions of this sort produce different voting lineups than
the rest of the Court's criminal cases; hawks and doves sometimes outflank
each other to the right and left. Thus the Court held for the government on
2
both the questions just asked;8 Scalia, Souter, and Stevens dissented in the
bartering case, and Rehnquist, Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg dissented in the
case concerning the defendant's glove compartment. The overall point is
seen in the following graph, which compares recent justices' voting patterns
3
in these kinds of cases with their votes in several other types.8

77.

See, e.g. , Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 5 1 5 U.S. 200 ( 1 995).

78. See, e.g. , United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 5 14
U.S. 549 (1995).
79.

See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton,.521 U.S. 203 ( 1 997).

80. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 9 1 4 (2000) (abortion rights); Abrams v. Johnson,
521 U.S. 74 ( 1 997) (interpretation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 §§ 2, 5, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973,
1973c (2000) ); Bush v. Vera, 5 1 7 U.S. 952 ( 1 996) (same); Shaw v. Hunt, 5 17 U.S. 899 ( 1 996)
(same).
81.

1 8 U.S.C. § 924(c)( l )(A) (2005).

82. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 ( 1 993) (barter); Muscarello v. United States, 524
U.S. 125 (1998) (glove compartment).
83. To prevent the graph from becoming so busy as to be illegible, I omitted a couple of
recent justices rather arbitrarily: Blackmun and Powell. For the curious reader, however, I will state
the numbers for those justices here. Blackmun voted for the government 67% of the time in cases
involving the substantive elements of an offense, 32% of the time in cases involving the Eighth
Amendment, 38% of the time in habeas corpus cases, and 53% of the time in cases involving the
Due Process Clause. Powell voted for the government 64% of the time in substantive cases, 64% of
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CHART 3: How OFTEN SELECTED U.S. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES HAVE
VOTED FOR THE GOVERNMENT IN NONUNANIMOUS CASES INVOLVING
PARTICULAR AREAS OF CRIMINAL LAW
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The line tracing the justices' votes in substantive cases shows some
striking departures from the others; it is the line that starts lower than all of
the others and then ends higher than the rest. Some justices vote for the gov

ernment about as often in all of these sorts of cases, but for others there are
large and striking differences. Why? The best explanation probably is that
substantive cases, unlike almost all the others, don't involve an underlying
trade-off between accuracy and its costs. It's just a question of whether the
defendant's conduct was allowed. The justices vary in their answers to that

type of question, but not in the same way they vary in replying to the oth
ers--or at least some of them display this variance. Others exhibit similar

tendencies in all types of criminal disputes, including these, perhaps sug
gesting that some sort of overall preference for giving one side a hand

dominates their reasoning across the board.

Another possibility is that some of the differences found in substantive
cases are a result of legal method. The obvious candidate for this explana
tion, as mentioned earlier, is Justice Scalia, whose sixty-point departure

the time in cases involving the Eighth Amendment, 80% of the time in cases involving interpreta
tions of habeas corpus, and 6 1 % of the time in cases involving the Due Process Clause.
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from form in substantive cases might be explained by his adherence to the
rule of lenity. Maybe this only shows that his preferences are different in the
substantive setting than elsewhere, but it might also be viewed as a small but
intriguing study in the power of doctrine to constrain a judge-or more pre
cisely in the ability of a judge to constrain himself by adhering to a doctrine.
There is good reason to think that Scalia has the priors we associate with a
friend of the government. We can infer this fairly directly from what he says
in his own opinions when called on to reckon the costs and benefits of a
84
and we can infer it indirectly from the consistency of his votes for the

rule,

government in statutory and constitutional settings-except, however, for
the substantive cases where he applies the rule of lenity and suddenly favors
the defendant more often than any of his colleagues.
The role of rules in deciding cases is an interesting frontier of interpre
85
The recent discussions tend to emphasize the value rules can

tive work.

have in making interpretation more economical or more accurate by one
metric or another, or in improving the legislative climate in which laws are
written in the first place. Perhaps the results produced by the rule of lenity
suggest afresh another value served by simple rules: they may cut down the
role of discretion that is likely to be guided by a judge's priors. The details
of this possibility are more complex than they first appear. If judges are
thrown onto their priors by the inability of law to arbitrate between compet
ing p lausible arguments, it might seem that the law helpfully could do more
by ruling out certain lines of argument entirely: never make appeals to the
expressio unius canon, or ignore arguments about the consequences of rul
ing one way or the other. But this is not so clear. Sometimes subtracting a
source of argument makes a case easier by taking inconclusive claims off
the table; sometimes the subtraction makes a case harder by leaving behind
only weak arguments and lots of room for discretion in selecting among
86
A strong appeal to expressio uni us sometimes can create unanimity,

them.

as can a powerful argument made from consequences. It's hard to get rid of

84.

For discussion, see Ward Farnsworth,

The Taste for Fairness, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1 992,

201 1- 1 5 (2002) (book review).
85.
For recent examples, see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 1 1 5 HARV. L. RE V. 2085 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended
Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 636 ( 1 999); and Vermeule, supra note 74.
86.

Thus Justice Stevens's recent defense o f the use o f legislative history:

In refusing to examine the legislative history that provides a clear answer to the question
whether Congress intended the scope of the mineral reservations in these two statutes to be
identical, the plurality abandons one of the most valuable tools of judicial decisionmaking. As
Justice Aharon Barak of the Israel Supreme Court perceptively has explained, the "minimalist"
judge "who holds that the purpose of the statute may be learned only from its language" retains
greater discretion than the judge who "will seek guidance from every reliable source."
JUDICIAL DISCRETION 62 (Y. Kaufmann transl. 1989). A method of statutory interpretation that
is deliberately uninformed, and hence unconstrained, increases the risk that the judge's own
policy preferences will affect the decisional process. Bedroc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S.
1 76, 1 92 (2004) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
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the weak forms of these arguments that spoil unanimity without also keep
ing out the strong ones that can create it.
But there are other things that rules of interpretation might do. Instead of
favoring one argument over another or taking some claims off the table, they
can amount to "if-then" instructions; and then much depends on the practi
cal clarity of the "if' clause-the triggering device-and the interest of the
judges in taking it seriously. The rule of lenity doesn' t apply until a text is
held ambiguous, which most of the justices seem reluctant to conclude.
Thus in

Smith v. United States,

the case asking whether a drug dealer "used"

a gun when he traded it for cocaine, Scalia said the statute was ambiguous,
invoked the rule of lenity, and would have held for the defendant. The ma
jority denied that the statute was ambiguous and so rejected the argument.
We are confronted with a familiar gap-an incompleteness-that law can't
close: it can give instructions about what to do with ambiguity, but judges
are on their own in deciding whether ambiguity is present in the first place.
And then there is the related problem, also familiar from our look at
some of the Court's other cases, that judges may agree about the amount of
ambiguity present but not about how much is needed to invoke the rule. One
version of the rule of lenity is that "where text, structure, and history fail to
establish that the Government's position is unambiguously correct[,] we
apply the rule of lenity and resolve the ambiguity in [the defendant's] fa
87
vor." Another is that the rule applies "only if, after seizing everything from
which aid can be derived, . . . we can make no more than a guess as to what
88
Congress intended." Some members of the current Court have signed on to
both of those definitions. Most have joined opinions offering other versions
of the rule that also are not quite consistent. There may be a process of deg
radation inevitable in a common law environment by which any such rule
will be restated often and differently enough to thus drain away much of its
utility as a constraint. W hether strategies like the rule of lenity might be de
vised for wider application, whether their benefits would outweigh their
costs, and whether there is any feasible way to interest more of the justices
in using them consistently all are questions for further research.
VI. CONCLUSION
At one level this article is an inquiry into criminal cases and how the
Supreme Court decides them. But it also might be considered an inquiry
into how courts decide cases of any kind; the mechanics by which judges'
values and preferences get translated into votes and opinions might be simi
lar everywhere. In all areas of law the justices often are confronted with
cases where the arguments are finely balanced and can be lined up to sup
port either side, with uncertainties that require them to imagine the world
and make guesses about it that will express their own views, with choices
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United States v. Granderson, 5 1 1 U.S. 39, 54 (1994).

88.

United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 ( 1 997) (citations omitted).
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about which of two sets of risks to prefer over the other, and with unguided
choices to make between plausible readings of legal texts. These mecha
nisms cause them to reach predictable results in criminal cases of all kinds
wherever the law isn't clear enough to produce unanimity; and the result
may be especially visible in the criminal area just because there are so many
more cases of the criminal variety than there are of any other single type.
Their numbers make it possible to line them all up and see the striking pat
terns emerge. Other legal subjects might yield equally striking patterns if
there were enough of them. It may be conjectured that the justices care more
about criminal cases than some other kinds and that their own values thus
89
but then it might as well be conjec

play a larger role here than elsewhere;

tured that the justices care less about criminal cases than they do about cases
involving race or religion or federalism or many other controversial areas of
law-areas where the justices' votes have followed patterns closely resem
bling those seen in our charts, and for similar reasons. But that is a tale for
another day.

89.
See Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain
Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REv. 23 1 (discussing consensus in dull cases).

